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TO TELL THE TRUTH: SHOULD ATTORNEYS BE
DIRECTLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CONTENT OF
APPLICATIONS FOR NEW RADIO AND TELEVISION
BROADCAST STATIONS?
Mark E. Wojcik*
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") has
the exclusive authority to grant licenses to persons who wish to construct and
operate radio and television broadcast stations in the United States.' The FCC
grants these licenses only upon written application.2 Each applicant must sign
the application, s unless he or she is physically unable to sign, or is absent from
the United States.' Significantly, there is no requirement that an applicant
submit the application under oath.'
Enticed by the prospect of obtaining a valuable broadcast license, applicants
may make material misrepresentations or fail to include all relevant informa-
* B.A., cum laude, Bradley University, 1983; J.D., with distinction, The John Marshall Law
School, 1986; LL.M. (in Trade Regulation), New York University School of Law, 1991. Admit-
ted to practice in Illinois, Nebraska, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New York.
1. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3003 (1990) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
301, 303, 307, 309 (1982)); T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH
ESTATE: THE REGULATION OF MASS MEDIA 44 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of the FCC's licensing duties).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 308(a) (1988). However, there are a few emergency situations in which no
written application may be necessary. Id.
3. The FCC requires individual applicants to sign their application, any amendments to' the
application, and any related statements. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3513(a)(1) (1990). If the applicant is a
partnership, one of the partners must sign. Id. § 73.3513(a)(2). If the applicant is a corporation, a
corporate officer may sign. Id. § 73.3513(a)(3). If the applicant is an unincorporated association,
a member who is an officer must sign. Id. § 73.3513(a)(4). If the applicant is a governmental
entity, a competent and duly elected or appointed official must sign the application. Id. §
73.3513(a)(5).
4. Id. § 73.3513(b). Where the applicant is unable to sign or is absent from the United States,
the applicant's attorney must explain why the document is not signed by the applicant. Id. Addi-
tionally, if any factual matter is based on an attorney's belief, rather than on his or her personal
knowledge, a separate statement describing the reasons for believing that such statements are true
must also be submitted. Id.
5. Id. § 73.3513(d). The FCC's regulations, but not the application form itself, provide that
any willful false statements made in an application, amendment, or related statement of fact will:
(a) violate 47 C.F.R. § 73.1015 (1990), rendering the application defective and subject to dismis-
sal pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 73.3566; (b) be punishable by fine and imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1988); and (c) be punishable by appropriate administrative sanctions, including revoca-
tion of the broadcast station license pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(i) (1988).
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tion in their applications for new radio or television broadcast stations. These
misrepresentations or omissions may go undiscovered in an ex parte adminis-
trative examination of the application.0 If discovered, willful false statements
in an application are punishable by fine and imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §
1001,7 and by appropriate administrative sanctions, including revocation of the
broadcast station license.8 These civil and criminal sanctions generally apply
only to the applicants who sign the application, however, and not to those who
prepare the application for signature.
This Article considers the desirability of making attorneys who prepare
FCC applications for new broadcast stations directly accountable for the con-
tent of those applications. It is the author's belief that the importance of the
public interest in broadcast communications, weighed against the danger of
potential abuse by applicants who hope to win a valuable asset, dictates that
attorneys be directly accountable for the content of applications to construct
or operate new broadcast stations.
This Article begins with a general background of the FCC's construction
permit and station licensing process. The Article will analyze the present laws,
regulations, and ethical considerations already affecting the liability of attor-
neys for written statements made to the Commission. This Article also will
consider experiences of other administrative agencies and conclude with a pro-
posal to increase attorney accountability for statements made in new broadcast
applications to the same enhanced duty of candor required of attorneys who
make submissions to the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The
scrupulous duties that the FCC requires of applicants should also apply to the
applicants' agents. In preparing applications for new television or radio broad-
cast stations, attorneys should investigate their clients' responses in the FCC
forms for factual verification as well as possible material omissions.
I. THE FCC's CONSTRUCTION PERMIT AND STATION LICENSING PROCESS
A. Applications for a New Broadcast Station
To obtain authority to construct or operate a new AM, FM, or television
broadcast station, an applicant must apply to the Federal Communications
Commission for a construction permit or station license.9 An applicant first
6. A proceeding before a judicial or administrative tribunal is said to be ex parte when the
tribunal acts at the instance and for the benefit of one party only. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576
(6th ed. 1990).
7. See infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text (discussing criminal sanctions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1988)).
8. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3513(d) (1990); see also 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(i) (1988) (providing for the
revocation of a station license or construction permit for knowingly making false statements in the
application or any written statement of fact); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1015 (requiring truthful written
statements and responses to FCC inquiries and correspondence).
9. The FCC Form 301 used to apply for authority to construct a new commercial station is also
used to apply for authority to make changes in the existing facilities of such stations. An applica-
tion for a new broadcast station license is made on FCC Form 302. While this Article is based on
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asks for a construction permit to build the new broadcast facility. 10 If no one
objects to the FCC's granting of the permit,' and if there are no other quali-
fied applicants for the same frequency,'3 the FCC may grant the application if
it would serve the "public convenience, interest, and necessity."' s If the FCC
grants the construction permit, the license to broadcast will follow almost au-
tomatically if the broadcast facility is constructed on schedule.'4
By statute, all applications for station licenses must set forth:
such facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizen-
ship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications of the ap-
plicant to operate the station; the ownership and location of the proposed
station and of the stations, if any, with which it is proposed to communicate;
the frequencies and the power to be used; the hours of the day or other
periods of time during which it is proposed to operate the station; the pur-
poses for which the station is to be used; and such other information as [the
Commission] may require.'
The application is filed with the part of the FCC called the Mass Media
Bureau.' 6 The bureau's staff reviews the papers to identify any deficiencies.' 7
If the application is routine, the FCC has authorized the staff of the Mass
Media Bureau to grant the application.' 8
At any time after the applicant files the original application, the FCC may
require further "written statements of fact" to enable the agency to determine
whether it should grant or deny the original application, or whether it should
revoke an existing license. 19 The statute also requires that any application or
statement of fact "be signed by the applicant and/or licensee."3 0
The FCC's regulations also require applicants for new broadcast stations to
the FCC Form 301, it is the author's belief that the public policy and ethical considerations
should apply equally to all broadcast station applications, amendments, written statements of fact,
and report forms submitted to the FCC. A list of these forms is set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 73.3500
(1990).
10. CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 89.
11. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing the procedures employed when an
objecting petition is filed).
12. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text (describing the procedures that are imple-
mented in "comparative hearings" when more than one applicant requests the same frequency).
13. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 307(c), 309(a) (1988); accord id. § 307(d) (1988) (same standard of
* public convenience, interest, and necessity used for license renewals); see also Matthew L. Spitzer,
The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 997 (1989) (describing
the license application procedure for broadcast media).
14. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 89.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b). The statute also applies to modifications and renewals of applications
for station licenses.
16. CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 89.
17. Id.
18. Id. However, if the staff discovers any factual or legal questions after examining the appli-
cation, a more complex inquiry is required. Id.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b).
20. Id.
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publish local notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the community
where the station will be licensed."' Since there is a requirement of public
notice, there is always a possibility that a member of the public will oppose the
application and file a petition to deny the application.22 There is also a possi-
bility that other qualified applicants may be seeking rights to the same fre-
quency, and this will require the FCC to conduct a "comparative hearing." 8
B. Petitions to Deny the New Broadcast Station Application
Any interested individual or citizens' group who objects to the authorization
of a new broadcast station may file a petition to deny the application.2 ' The
petition to deny must contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that
the petitioner is a party in interest 8 and that the Commission's grant of the
broadcast station application would be prima facie inconsistent with the public
interest.26 Except for those facts of which official notice may be taken, the
factual allegations of the petition to deny must be supported by an affidavit of
someone having personal knowledge of those facts .2
If the affidavit raises a substantial and material question of fact, the Com-
mission will hold a public hearing on the petition to deny.28 Responsible repre-
sentatives of the public will be allowed to present their arguments to the Com-
mission, and the hearing may be lengthy and expensive.2 9 At the conclusion of
the public hearing, the Commission must grant either the application or the
petition to deny, or take some further action such as holding an additional
hearing. 0
C. Comparative Hearings
Where there are other acceptable and bona fide applications for a broad-
casting license or new station construction permit, the FCC will conduct a
"comparative hearing" to decide which applicant will best serve the public
interest." The competing applications are termed "mutually exclusive," be-
21. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3580 (1990). The general instructions for FCC Form 301 also remind the
applicant of the public notice requirements.
22. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing petitions to deny an application
for a broadcast license).
23. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of FCC comparative hearing
procedures when there is more than one bona fide applicant for the same frequency.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1988); Spitzer, supra note 13, at 997.
25. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 93-94 (discussing standing for listeners).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584 (1990) (explaining the procedures to
file petitions to deny applications for certain television stations); Spitzer, supra note 13, at 997.
27. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584(b).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3593.
29. Spitzer, supra note 13, at 997 (noting the cost of a hearing could be hundreds of thousands
of dollars).
30. 47 U.S.C. §309(d), (e); Spitzer, supra note 13, at 997 (describing the FCC's alternatives in
the case that additional hearings are required).
31. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3004 n.5 (1990) (citing Ashbacker
310 [Vol. 41:307
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cause only one license can be granted.82 When the FCC compares mutually
exclusive applications for new radio or television broadcast stations, it consid-
ers factors such as the diversification of control over the mass media, an
owner's full-time participation in station operation, proposed programming,
the applicant's past broadcasting experience, efficient use of the frequency,
and the character of the applicants.88 Under statutory mandate and the Su-
preme Court's approval of the FCC policy in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,s5 the FCC also considers it beneficial if a member of a minority group s6
will own the station and actively participate in its day-to-day management. 7
The FCC compares competing applications with regard to all relevant as-
pects of the public interest, and, in theory, awards the license to the applicant
who will best serve the public interest.88 The hearings can be extremely
lengthy because each of the two or more competing parties may not only at-
tempt to argue why it should receive the license, but also may present evidence
attacking each of the other applications.88
D. Observations on the FCC Application Process
The petition to dismiss an application 0 and the comparative hearing to
Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945)); see also Spitzer, supra note 13, at 997-98 (discussing
FCC procedures for comparative hearings).
32. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 91.
33. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3004-05 (citing Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) and West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735
F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985)).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (1988) (stating a preference for applicants controlled by a mem-
ber or members of a minority group).
35. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
36. The statute provides that the term "'minority group' includes Blacks, Hispanics, American
Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders." 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(C). Although
women are not expressly identified as a minority group, Congress' use of the word "includes"
implies that the list is not exhaustive.
37. Professor Patricia Williams of the University of Wisconsin Law School observes that even
if the Supreme Court's holding in Metro Broadcasting does not guarantee that minority owners
will diversify programming in any meaningful way, the holding does increase the likelihood of
diversification. Professor Williams also comments that, while the dissenters in Metro Broadcasting
implicitly insisted on a guarantee that there be some relationship between minority ownership and
programming for minorities, such a strict guarantee could never be attained without diminishing
First Amendment freedoms. Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping
in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 545 (1990).
38. See Cleveland Television Corp. v. FCC, 732 F.2d 962, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (deciding that
FCC's grant of a license to the plaintiff's competitor, as opposed to the plaintiff, was in the best
interests of the public); Telocator Network of Am. v. FCC, 691 F.2d 525, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(reminding the FCC that preferences should not be given to those already in possession of a
license, and that the FCC's duty is to select the applicant best able to serve the public interest);
Spitzer, supra note 13, at 998 (describing the ranking procedure used by the FCC to determine
which applicant would best serve the public interest).
39. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 91.
40. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing FCC procedures for petitions to
deny applicants broadcast licenses).
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choose between competing qualified applicants4 both represent opportunities
to challenge applications for new broadcast stations. The challenges may be on
grounds of public interest, but they also may challenge applications as defi-
cient, unsubstantiated, or untrue. If an application is not in accordance with
FCC rules, regulations, and other requirements, it will generally be considered
defective and will be rejected or dismissed."2 The applications are complex and
highly technical, and the statutory and regulatory requirements are strict. In-
deed, courts have held that before a comparative hearing can be held, or at
least before the FCC can issue a license or permit, the FCC must determine
that the applicant meets the citizenship, character, financial, technical, and
other qualifications prescribed by the FCC.48
An applicant sets forth his or her qualifications in the responses to the for-
mal FCC application form. Each application must include all information
called for by the particular FCC form on which the application must be
filed.'4 The FCC also may require an applicant to submit supplementary state-
ments of fact or additional documentation, or the FCC may order an applicant
to amend the application to make it more definite and certain.45 If the applica-
tion is facially sufficient, the FCC generally does not require any additional
documentation or amendments to the application. Thus, in an uncontested ex
parte proceeding, the FCC application form for a new broadcast station may
provide the exclusive basis for the FCC to grant a construction permit or sta-
tion license.' 6
The Commission staff reviews the application and prepares a report with a
recommendation for the Commission to either grant or deny the application.' 7
However, the staff may lack the time and resources to investigate factual rep-
resentations in the application. Administrative verification of each statement
in each application places too great a burden upon the Commission's limited
resources. Consequently, facts in an application may go unchallenged in ex
parte proceedings. There is a belief that ex parte proceedings before adminis-
trative agencies are inherently unreliable.' 8 Yet, even in contested proceedings
41. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text (discussing FCC comparative hearing
procedures).
42. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3566(a) (1990). When an application is not in accordance with FCC rules,
the applicant may file an appropriate request for a waiver or exception. There is no guarantee,
however, that the FCC will grant the waiver or exception. Id.
43. See, e.g., Fidelity Television v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 697 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
926 (1975); see also CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 94-96 (describing certain basic qualifications
that applicants must meet before the FCC can issue them a license or permit).
44. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3514(a). A full list of FCC forms is set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 73.3500.
45. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1988); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3514(b).
46. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a). If there is a substantial and material question of fact, or if the
FCC is unable to find that the application is in the public interest, the FCC may also order a
hearing under 47 U.S.C. § 309(e).
47. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3561; CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 89.
48. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (9th Cir.) (referring to the
examination of patent applications by the Patent and Trademark Office), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
996 (1983).
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involving a petition to deny or a competitive hearing, factual allegations in an
application may still go unchallenged. Contested proceedings may focus only
on the statutory arguments about whether the application for a new broadcast
station is in the public interest."9 Thus, even contested proceedings may ignore
the possibility that factual representations in the application may be false or
incomplete.
II. ANALYSIS OF ATTORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY IN PREPARING
APPLICATIONS
A. Preliminary Observations
The complexity of formal applications, the intricacies of effective communi-
cation with the Commission and its staff, and the need to understand and com-
ply with strict statutory and regulatory requirements all dictate that attorneys
be involved in the formal applications for new broadcast stations. Often an
attorney will complete the formal application for the client's signature, using
information supplied by the client or agents of the client. The attorney may or
may not independently investigate any of the information provided. It is, after
all, the client who must sign the application." Furthermore, neither the crimi-
nal statutes nor the FCC statutes or regulations expressly make attorneys lia-
ble for the contents of the applications they prepare for their clients. The lack
of express provisions may lull attorneys into a false sense of security in blind
reliance upon the client.
Often the attorney will be entirely justified in relying upon the client's rep-
resentations of fact. In some cases, however, the attorney's reliance may be
misplaced. There is no guarantee that a client will tell the entire truth, or that
the client will even tell the truth at all. The client has a strong financial inter-
est in obtaining a broadcast station license. The station will bring in substan-
tial sums of money from advertising revenue and from a possible sale of the
station after it is operational." Yet, even in cases where the attorney may be
justified in relying upon the client's representations of fact, there is no justifi-
cation for complacency about the attorney's responsibilities to the administra-
tive tribunal and about the possibilities that the attorney will face criminal
and civil liability and professional disciplinary proceedings.
49. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (discussing FCC considerations in granting a license).
50. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3515(a). A limited exception to the client signature requirement has been
created for circumstances where the client is physically unable to sign the application or is absent
from the United States. Under the FCC's regulations, an attorney may sign the application,
amendments, and related statements of fact in these cases. Id. § 73.3513(b). The attorney must
explain why the applicant is not personally signing, and if any matter is stated on the basis of the
attorney's belief only, the attorney must explain the basis for believing that the statements are
true. Id.
51. For example, WFYR, now known as WWBZ, was sold in 1991 for $19 million. James
Warren, Radio Tone Turns Somber After 80's Buying Binge, CHI. TRwD., Sept. 15, 1991, § 7, at 1,
5.
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B. Present Criminal and Civil Laws, Administrative Regulations, and
Ethical Considerations
1. Criminal Sanctions
Section 1001 of the federal criminal statutes5 2 provides that:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses
any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, ficti-
tious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.58
Anyone who knowingly or willfully makes a false statement in an applica-
tion for a new broadcast station can be prosecuted, sentenced, and fined under
this criminal statute. The essential elements that the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt in a prosecution under section 1001 are that the
defendant made a statement; the defendant knew that the statement was false,
fictitious, or fraudulent; the statement was made knowingly and willfully; the
statement was within the jurisdiction of the federal agency; and the statement
was material."
A statement made to obtain a new broadcast station is within the FCC's
jurisdiction because the Commission has the exclusive authority to grant
broadcast licenses.55 Although the false statement in the broadcast station ap-
plication must be made willfully, it is not necessary for the government to
prove that the defendant had an "evil intent." The word "willfulness" means
only that the defendant did the forbidden act "deliberately and with knowl-
edge."5  With regard to whether the statement made is "material," the FCC
application Form 301 states that "the applicant acknowledges that all state-
ments made in this application and attached exhibits are considered material
representations, and that all exhibits are a material part hereof and incorpo-
rated herein."58 The instructions to Form 301 also advise that: "Replies to
questions in this form and the applicant's statements constitute representations
on which the FCC will rely in considering the application. Thus, time and care
should be devoted to all replies, which should reflect accurately the applicant's
responsible consideration of the questions asked."59 It only follows that most
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
53. Id.
54. See United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing the govern-
ment's burden of proof under section 1001).
55. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3003 (1990) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
301, 303, 307, 309 (1982)); CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 44.
56. Carrier, 654 F.2d at 561.
57. Id.
58. FCC Form 301, at 24.
59. FCC Form 301 Instructions, at 2.
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responses on the application will be considered material.
While an applicant who knowingly makes a false statement in an FCC ap-
plication form can be charged with the crime under section 1001,0 someone
who assists the applicant in creating the false statement can face charges of
either conspiring to violate section 1001,61 or of aiding or abetting another to
violate section 1001.2
Lawyers should not believe that they are immune from prosecution under
section 1001,68 or for conspiring" to violate the section or for aiding and abet-
ting" someone to violate the section. Attorneys have been convicted under sec-
tion 1001 for written statements submitted to administrative agencies. Two
examples of these cases involved statements made to the United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service ("INS").
An immigration attorney was convicted in United States v. Abrams66 for his
role in creating an affidavit relating to an application for an extension of a stay
of deportation. The affidavit, purportedly made by a client's son, falsely stated
that the client intended to depart the United States on a scheduled date and
had made plans for this voluntary departure.67 In affirming the attorney's con-
viction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in
Abrams that although the attorney may not have been specifically aware of
what the client's plans for departure were, the jury could have found from the
evidence that the attorney "acted with reckless disregard of whether the state-
ments made were true and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth."6"
The Second Circuit expanded its decision in Abrams in another case involv-
ing an immigration attorney: United States v. Sarantos.6 The case involved
sham marriages conducted for immigration purposes. The attorney prepared
and filed visa petitions shortly after a sham wedding ceremony.70 The petitions
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988); see supra text accompanying note 53 (quoting statutory language
proscribing false representations to a federal agency).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988). For an explanation of how 18 U.S.C. § 371 creates liability for
conspiracy to violate section 1001, see generally United States v. Lafauric, 833 F.2d 1468 (1 th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (1 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 847 (1984); United States v. Anderson, 579 F.2d 455 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988). For an explanation of how this section creates liability for aiding
and abetting another to violate section 1001, see generally United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699
(I lth Cir. 1983); United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lanier,
578 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 856 (1978).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
64. Id. § 371.
65. Id. § 2(a).
66. 427 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970).
67. Id. at 91.
68. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) and Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.
273 U.S. 713 (1926)).
69. 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. Id. at 879.
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stated falsely that the parties were living together as husband and wife." The
attorney also instructed American spouses who were summoned before the
INS to say that they were living with their foreign spouses and not to mention
that they were paid to marry."" Although the government failed to show that
the attorney was ever explicitly informed of the sham nature of the marriages,
the Sarantos court upheld the attorney's convictions of conspiring to make
false statements to the INS78 to defraud the United States under section
1001,7 and of aiding and abetting others to make false statements to the
INS.75 The court concluded that the attorney should have known of the sham
nature of the marriages because some of the newlyweds required interpreters
(since the spouses shared no common language), divorce papers were executed
simultaneously with immigration papers, the attorney was told that the Ameri-
can citizens were paid a fee to marry, and the attorney was "at least indirectly
informed that the parties were not living together." 76
The defendant in Sarantos argued that to prove an attorney guilty of aiding
and abetting a client to make a false statement to an administrative agency, it
cannot be enough to show reckless disregard of the truth.7 7 The attorney
claimed that requiring only reckless disregard of the truth would radically al-
ter the attorney-client relationship and turn the attorney into "an investigative
arm of the government." '7 8 In rejecting the attorney's defenses, the court stated
that the purpose of the Abrams decision was to prevent attorneys from cir-
cumventing criminal sanctions merely by closing their eyes to obviously unlaw-
ful conduct. The court construed the word "knowingly" to close a possible
loophole by including an attorney's willful blindness to the truth.7 9 The court
also denied that attorneys must investigate the truth of their client's assertions
"or risk going to jail."80 The court emphasized that its holding was that an
attorney could not counsel others to make statements to administrative agen-
cies when the obvious indications are that those statements are false.8'
The Federal Communications Commission is aware of both the Sarantos
and Abrams decisions that held attorneys criminally liable under section
1001.82 The FCC Review Board cited Sarantos in In re Fox River Broadcast-
ing8s8 for the proposition that "[t]o sustain a § 1001 charge, it must be shown
71. Id.
72. Id. at 880.
73. Id. at 879 (convicting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988)).
74. Id. (convicting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).
75. Id. (convicting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988)).
76. Id. at 880.
77. Id. at 880-81.
78. Id. at 881.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964)).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
83. 88 F.C.C.2d 1132 (1982).
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that the statement was not a 'careless act'; but even a statement made in 'a
conscious effort to avoid learning the truth' or 'reckless disregard' of the truth
is culpable conduct under that statute. ' 84 The Commission cited Abrams in In
re Hale,88 which involved a broadcaster's affirmative misrepresentations and
lack of candor before the Commission. The FCC's citations of Sarantos and
Abrams, however, did not relate to the liability of attorneys for assertions
made in written statements presented to the Commission.
2. Program Fraud Civil Remedies
Other administrative agencies utilize extensive regulations to impose,
through administrative adjudication, civil penalties and assessments against
persons who make false claims or statements to the agencies. Recently adopted
rules implement the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act ("Act"), 86 which
Congress enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986.' 7
The Act provides for administrative adjudication where a person makes a
claim or written statement that the person knows, or has reason to know, is
false, fictitious, or fraudulent.88 Liability attaches under the Act for any false,
fictitious, or fraudulent claim for property, services, or money, and for any
written statement that is false, fictitious, or fraudulent with respect to any
claim, contract, bid, contract proposal, grant, loan, or benefit. 8 If a person
making such a claim or statement to an agency under the statute does so with
actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance of its falsity, or acts with reckless
disregard for the truth, the person can be held liable for a civil penalty of up
to $5000 for each claim or statement.90 The law requires no proof of specific
intent to defraud. 1 As an additional penalty, the person may be subject to an
assessment of up to twice the amount paid out pursuant to a false claim. 2 The\
implementing regulations set forth extensive administrative procedures to ad-
judicate liability under the statute.8 In the statute's legislative history, the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee stated that it expected "that the reg-
ulations would be substantially the same throughout government." '94
The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act is directed at claims involving
money or property. The statute and implementing regulations of various agen-
84. Id. at 1135 n.6 (1982) (quoting United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 880-81 (2d Cir.
1972)).
85. 95 F.C.C.2d 682, 697-98 (1983).
86. 31 U.S.C, §§ 3801-3812 (1988).
87. The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act was enacted on October 21, 1986, as sections 6103
and 6104 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874.
88. Program Fraud Civil Remedies, 15 C.F.R. § 25.1 (1991).
89. Id. § 25.3.
90. Id.
91. See 31 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(5) (1988).
92. Id. § 3802(a), (d); Program Fraud Civil Remedies, 15 C.F.R. § 25.3(a)(5).
93. See, e.g., Program Fraud Civil Remedies, 15 C.F.R. §§ 25.4-.47 (exemplifying such imple-
menting regulations).
94. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 212, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985)).
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cies apply to claims for property, services, or money, including money repre-
senting grants, loans, insurance, or benefits.95 The statute and regulations also
apply to claims made to an administrative authority (other than the Internal
Revenue Service) to decrease a person's obligation to pay or account for prop-
erty, services, or money.96
The Act is not limited to false claims for money and property, however. The
statute also applies to false written statements.9" Additionally, the scope of the
statutory language is broad enough to cover the actions of attorneys. The stat-
ute identifies as potentially liable "any person who makes, presents, or sub-
mits, or causes to be made, presented or submitted, a written statement that
the person knows or has reason to know asserts a material fact which is false,
fictitious, or fraudulent."98 The written statement is also actionable if it omits
a material fact, so that the statement is false, fictitious, or fraudulent because
of the omission.99 In the case of an omission, however, the person making,
presenting, or submitting the written statement must be under a duty to in-
clude the material fact.1"' The written statement also must contain an express
certification or affirmation of the truthfulness and accuracy of the contents of
the statement.101 If all the requirements of the violation are met, the person
who makes, presents, or submits the written statement is subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $5000 for each statement.1 02 This civil penalty is in
addition to any other remedy that may be prescribed by law.103 Thus, one who
makes a willful false statement can be subject to a criminal fine of up to
$5000 and an additional civil penalty of up to $5000.
3. Commission Regulations
Despite the inclusive wording of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act,
the FCC has not promulgated any regulations under that statute. This may be
because of the statutory emphasis on fraudulent statements to obtain money or
property. The assignment of radio and television licenses is not a "program"
within the purposes of the Act, and it is an open question whether a license or
construction permit would constitute "property" for purposes of the Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act. Property is not expressly defined in the statute.
Nevertheless, the FCC's present regulations do require that statements sub-
mitted to the Commission be truthful. With regard to an applicant's written
submissions to the Commission, section 73.1015 of the Commission's regula-
tions provide in relevant part:
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(3)(A) (1988).
96. Id. § 3801(a)(3)(C).
97. Id. § 3802(a)(2).
98. Id. § 3802(a)(2)(A)(i).
99. Id. § 3802(a)(2)(A)(ii).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 3802(a)(2)(C).
102. Id. § 3802(a)(2).
103. Id.
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The Commission or its representatives may, in writing, require from any
applicant . . . written statements of fact relevant to a determination
whether an application should be granted or denied .... No applicant...
shall in any response to Commission correspondence or inquiry in any.appli-
cation, pleading, report or other written statement submitted to the Com-
mission, make any misrepresentation or willful material omission bearing on
any matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission.1"
Section 73.1015 of the FCC's regulations thus imposes a duty upon appli-
cants to avoid making any misrepresentation or willful material omission in an
application for a new broadcast station. The FCC's regulations requiring ap-
plicants to sign their applications 10 5 also provide that any willfully false state-
ments made in an application, amendment, or related statement of fact made
to the FCC will violate section 73.1015 of the Commission's regulations 0 6 and
may be punishable by criminal fine and imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §
1001.107 The FCC's regulations also warn that the discovery of a willful false
statement in an application for a new broadcast station is punishable by ap-
propriate administrative sanctions, including revocation of the broadcast sta-
tion license. 108
The administrative regulations and sanctions discussed above apply to appli-
cants for new broadcast stations, and generally not to those who assist in pre-
paring the application for a new television or radio broadcast station. If the
FCC finds that an attorney who prepared an application for a client knew of
the false statement, however, an "appropriate administrative sanction" against
the attorney might be disbarment from practice before the Commission.1 0
This administrative sanction would be in addition to any other civil or criminal
penalty that may be imposed on the attorney. The suspension may be tempo-
rary or permanent, depending on the circumstances of the violation. A suspen-
sion would be a meaningful sanction against attorneys who practice regularly
before the FCC. Inexperience in preparing an application may be a mitigating
factor for attorneys who did not know of false statements, but who should have
known from the context of the application that a certain representation was
false or misleading.
4. Rules of Professional Conduct
In addition to the federal statutes and regulations, state codes of profes-
104. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1015 (1990).
105. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the signature requirement.
106. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1015.
107. Id. § 73.3515(d).
108. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(1) (1988) (providing for same).
109. The possibility of disbarment from practice before an administrative agency and the fur-
ther prospect of professional discipline have been deemed to constitute sufficient security to protect
the confidentiality of information released under administrative protective orders. See, e.g., D & L
Supply v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 732, 735 (1988). The FCC may likewise adopt the
possibility of disbarment from practice before it as a sanction.
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sional responsibility and rules of professional conduct implicate a proper stan-
dard of candor toward administrative and judicial tribunals. The ethical rules
binding attorneys may vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.1" In the
District of Columbia, where the Federal Communications Commission is lo-
cated, Rule 3.3 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct111 governs candor
toward tribunals. 12 Paragraph (a) of the rule provides that a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) counsel or assist a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a
client to make a good-faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning,
or application of the law;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling juris-
diction not disclosed by opposing counsel and known to the lawyer to be
dispositive of a question at issue and directly adverse to the position of the
client; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, except as provided in
paragraph (b).113
These four ethical duties "continue to the conclusion of the proceeding."" 4
If the attorney is retained only to obtain a new broadcast station license, the
"conclusion of the proceeding" would appear to be when the FCC issues a
construction permit or new station license. The attorney-client relationship will
usually extend beyond that time, however. The attorney may be called upon
later in connection with a license renewal. In these circumstances, there may
be practically no "conclusion" to the proceedings because another renewal will
always be in the future. Furthermore, Rule 3.3(d) of the D.C. Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that a fraud has
been perpetrated upon the tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the
110. Many jurisdictions base their ethical rules on the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, while others base their rules on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which the American
Bar Association approved on August.2, 1983.
111. The District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct entered into effect on January 1,
1991, replacing the prior D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility. D.C. R. PROF. CONDUCT,
Preface.
112. For purposes of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, a tribunal is defined as "a court,
regulatory agency, commission and any other body or individual authorized by law to render deci-
sions of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, based on information presented before it, regardless of
the degree of formality or informality of the proceedings." Id. at xi.
113. Id. Rule 3.3(a). Paragraph (b) of Rule 3.3 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct
allows a lawyer to permit a client who is a defendant in a criminal case to present false testimony
in very narrowly circumscribed circumstances and in a very limited manner. The exception will
not apply in administrative licensing proceedings before the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. Id. Rule 3.3(b).
114. Id. Rule 3.3(c).
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tribunal unless compliance with this duty would require disclosure of infor-
mation otherwise protected by Rule 1.6, in which case the lawyer shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the fraud." 5
A comment to Rule 3.3 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct notes
that the rule "defines the duty of candor to the tribunal.""" Significantly, the
comment also provides that "an advocate does not vouch for the evidence sub-
mitted in a cause; the tribunal is responsible for assessing its probative
value.""' 7
The lawyer's duty of candor before administrative agencies is thus defined
under the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct by circumstances where the at-
torney "knows" of a false statement of material fact, or where the attorney
receives information "clearly establishing" the perpetration of a fraud upon
the tribunal. In neither circumstance is there an express duty in circumstances
where an attorney does not know, but reasonably should know, of a false mate-
rial fact or omission. The comment further implies that there is no affirmative
duty upon the attorney to investigate facts presented in, for example, an appli-
cation for a new radio or television broadcast station.
By way of comparison, the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provide
that lawyers appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal may not
"make a statement of material fact or law to a tribunal which the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know is false."'" 8 The Illinois rules are more ex-
plicit than the District of Columbia rules concerning statements that an attor-
ney knows, or reasonably should know, are false. The duty to investigate fac-
tual representations made to an attorney thus may be greater under the
Illinois ethical rules than under the District of Columbia rules. Additionally,
the Illinois Rules list further prohibitions on attorneys who appear before ad-
ministrative and judicial tribunals. The Illinois rule provides that in appearing
in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(2) fail to disclose to a tribunal a material fact known to the lawyer when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the
client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling juris-
diction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel;
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has of-
fered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall
take reasonable remedial measures;
(5) participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer
115. Id. Rule 3.3(d). The referenced Rule 1.6 of the D.C Rules of Professional Conduct relates
to confidential information protected under the attorney-client privilege and "secrets" gained in
the professional relationship that either the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure
of which would be embarrassing or likely be detrimental to the client. Id. Rule 1.6.
116. Id. Rule 3.3(d) cmt. 1.
117. Id.
118. ILL. R. PROF. CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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knows or reasonably should know the evidence is false;
(6) counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent;
(7) engage in other illegal conduct or conduct in violation of these Rules
[of Professional Conduct];
(8) fail to disclose the identities of the clients represented and of the per-
sons who employed the lawyer unless such information is privileged or
irrelevant;
(12) fail to use reasonable efforts to restrain and to prevent clients from
doing those things that the lawyer ought not to do;
(13) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or client has a legal obligation
to reveal or produce; .... 119
Each jurisdiction has its own ethical rules based on the model codes or rules.
The phrasing may be different in each jurisdiction, but common ethical
themes will usually emerge on basic questions of client representation. Portions
of Nebraska's Code of Professional Responsibility, for example, provide that
in representing a client, a lawyer shall not:
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law
to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preseriation of evidence when he knows
or it is obvious that the evidence is false.
120
Ethical Consideration 8-5 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
also provides that:
Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in a pro-
ceeding before a tribunal or legislative body is inconsistent with fair admin-
istration of justice, and it should never be participated in or condoned by
lawyers. Unless constrained by his obligation to preserve the confidences and
secrets of his client, a lawyer should reveal to the appropriate authorities
any knowledge he may have of such improper conduct."1
In spite of common ethical themes that run between rules in a jurisdiction's
Code of Professional Responsibility or Rules of Professional Conduct, the poli-
cies that underlie different ethical rules may sometimes be in tension with
each other. For example, the duty to zealously represent a client may conflict
with the duty to make no statement of material fact that the lawyer knows (or
reasonably should know) is false."" Lawyers are trained to weigh conflicting
values and to exercise good judgment in the presentation of a case. At a mini-
mum, lawyers must be sensitive to their ethical duties and must not avoid
119. Id. Rule 3.3.
120. NEB. CODE PROF. RESP. DR 7-102 (emphasis added).
121. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-5 (1980).
122. ILL. R. PROF. CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1).
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making an ethical decision simply because to do so may be difficult or
unpleasant.
Any invocation of ethical rules, however, must place those rules in their
proper context. Courts have refused to use ethical codes to define standards of
civil liabilities for lawyers, finding that violations of the disciplinary rules
should neither give rise to a cause of action nor create any presumption that a
legal duty has been breached. 18 These cases involve alleged injuries to third
parties. The "clear" rationale for these rulings, as explained by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, is that the drafters of the
ethical rules intended them to regulate the conduct of lawyers, "not to create
actionable duties in favor of third parties."12'
This same "clear" rationale may not apply in the context of ex parte pro-
ceedings before administrative tribunals. There may not be any third party
seeking to create an actionable duty in its favor. The attorney is dealing solely
with the agency.
C. The Public Interest in the Airwaves
Against the backdrop of the FCC's licensing process and the complex laws,
regulations, and disciplinary rules that may arise in the licensing process
stands the important public interest in proper distribution of new radio and
television broadcast licenses. The Supreme Court has recognized that, given
the scarcity of electromagnetic frequencies, the FCC may place restraints on
licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on radio and tele-
vision.' 2 ' The FCC's charge to distribute the limited number of broadcast li-
censes is more than that of a mere "traffic officer." 128 To this end, the FCC
must administer broadcast licenses considering the rights of the viewing and
listening audience. 127 Indeed, the public interest must be the overriding con-
123. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that an ethical
responsibility did not create a corresponding legal duty); Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson,
Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A., 655 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that a viola-
tion of a disciplinary rule created no presumption that a legal duty had been breached), affd
mer., 846 F.2d 753 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 854 (1988); Bickle v. Mackie, 447 F.
Supp. 1376, 1383-84 (N.D. Iowa) (refusing to recognize a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as negligence per se), affd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978); Merritt-Chapman
& Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1972) (noting that the remedy
for an attorney's breach of his oath is a public remedy rather than a private one), affid mem., 477
F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1973); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973) (refusing to hold an attorney civilly liable for violating a rule of professional conduct);
Nagy v. Beckley, 578 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that the limited authority
in Illinois suggests that the rules of legal ethics do not establish a separate duty or cause of action
for their breach).
124. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 492.
125. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990); Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
126. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010 (citing NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215
(1943)).
127. Id. (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
1992]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
cern in the FCC's licensing of new radio and television broadcast stations. In
contrast to activities of some other administrative agencies, such as the United
States Customs Service, which collects customs and other duties on imported
merchandise, the grant of a license to one person or another does not result in
a significant monetary gain to the government.
D. Comparative Agency Experience
The grant of a government license to exclusive use of the public airwaves is,
in some ways, comparable to an exclusive government grant in the form of a
patent. Patent rights in the United States derive from the Constitution, which
empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progess of Science . . ., by securing for
limited Times to . .. Inventors the exclusive Right to their . ..Discover-
ies." 12 8 A patent is thus a "legal monopoly securing to an inventor for a term
of years the exclusive right to make, use or sell his invention." 129 The scheme
of patent statutes is in title 35 of the United States Code. 8
The federal patent process has been described as "relatively unique because
it involves the grant of a monopoly by an administrative agency to a typically
unopposed party at a time prior to that at which other parties who might wish
to contest the grant have the opportunity to be heard." '' The Patent and
Trademark Office's ("PTO's") 82 administrative process of granting a patent
keeps the contents of a patent application secret until the patent issues.' 88 The
contents of the patent application, therefore, may often go unchallenged be-
cause of the practical difficulties of expensive and complex litigation to contest
the grant of the patent."' Additionally, the patent is presumed to be valid
once granted,8 5 and courts will generally defer to agency determinations, es-
pecially in highly technical areas.' 86
Recognizing both the practical influence that the initial PTO decision has in
determining most patent issues, and the unique position that an applicant has
to influence the PTO's initial decision, a strict "duty of candor" is imposed
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
129. United States Customs Service, Patent Surveys, Process Patents and Exclusion Orders,
Customs Directive 2300-06 (Nov. 21, 1989).
130. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
131. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 114 (2d ed. 1990).
132. The Patent and Trademark Office is an administrative agency within the United States
Department of Commerce.
133. See, e.g., John Crewdson, AIDS Blood Test New Target of Probe, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29,
1991, § 1, at 1, 17 (describing how patent attorneys for the United States government did not
know that patent attorneys for the Pasteur Institute in France had applied less than five months
earlier for a United States patent on a blood test for the HIV antibody).
134. See MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 131, at 114-15.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
136. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 90-91 (citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)); MILLER & DAVIS,
supra note 131, at 115.
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upon patent applicants." 7 The PTO's administrative patent process is an ex
parte proceeding, which courts describe as "inherently unreliable." '138 Because
patent procedures are ex parte, and because the procedures will inure to the
benefit of the patent applicant, the strict duty of candor balances any unfair-
ness that may otherwise occur if the applicant were to enjoy the benefits of an
ex parte process without any corresponding duty.139
The duty of candor in patent proceedings is "enforced with the whip of
[patent] invalidity."" 0 Specifically,
[a] breach of the duty can result in the striking of an application or in the
invalidation of a patent; it can defeat an otherwise valid claim of [patent]
infringement; it even can result in a patent being issued to a rival party in
an interference proceeding despite priority [in time of the patent applica-
tion] or other merit lying in the party who violated the duty.14 1
Additionally, if the breach of the duty of candor amounts to fraud, attorneys'
fees may be awarded in later court actions against the defaulting party.142
The duty of candor requires the patent applicant to inform the PTO of all
material information of which the inventor is aware.143 A breach of the duty
requires something more than simple negligence, but something less than con-
scious fraud. 144 Gross negligence may be enough to violate the duty.1 45
A person is under the duty of candor only to the extent of his or her actual
participation in the patenting process." Commentators note that the duty of
candor varies according to a person's actual activities before the PTO:
A different duty might be imposed upon a person who is relatively passive
during the process with respect to a prior art reference, for example, than
upon his attorney who may be consciously aware of some pertinent infor-
mation unearthed during the patent prosecution process. However, it is not
unusual for the sins of the attorney to be visited upon the client.1"7
An inventor and his or her lawyers thus have the affirmative duty to disclose
material information to the PTO.1 " It is not enough to avoid actively mislead-
ing the PTO. 49 Information is material if "there is a substantial likelihood
137. See MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 131, at 115 (discussing the duty of candor).
138. E.g., Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 996 (1983).
139. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 131, at 115.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 115-16.
143. Id. at 116.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 117.
149. Id.
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that a reasonable [patent] examiner would consider it important.' 50
Accordingly,
an applicant who knows of information (or who perhaps only, through calcu-
lated recklessness, is ignorant of such information) bearing upon patentabil-
ity that is quite likely to be considered important by an examiner, even if it
is not determinative, has the duty of disclosing the information. This objec-
tive standard with respect to materiality, in contrast to the relatively subjec-
tive state of mind, potentially is quite harsh. Because the applicant may be
held in breach merely for the failure to so disclose and because the material
information need only be important, the potential impact of the duty of can-
dor is sizeable. 51
E. Observations
The FCC's grant of an exclusive government license to use the public air-
waves is comparable to the PTO's grant of exclusive rights in a patent. The
administrative proceedings for both are also analogous when they are ex parte.
The clients also share similar financial motivations to obtain a patent and to
obtain a broadcast license. The strict duty of candor that applies to proceed-
ings before the PTO, therefore, also should be expressly adopted for written
submissions made to the FCC.
The FCC Review Board has found that "[f]ack of candor, unlike misrepre-
sentation, does not arise directly out of the more universal requirement that
intentionally false statements not be made in connection with an application or
adjudicatory proceeding before any federal agency."155 Rather, the duty of
candor before the FCC arises "out of the 'special status of licensees as trustees
of a scarce public resource.' "158 The FCC Board also has noted suggestions
that the FCC would be derelict if it did not ask federal licensees to be
"scrupulous in providing complete and meaningful information" in application
forms.' 5
What the FCC asks of applicants it must ask also of the applicants' agents.
Attorneys who practice before the Commission should be held to the same
scrupulous standards. Thus, in preparing applications for new television or ra-
dio broadcast stations, attorneys should investigate responses in the FCC
forms for factual verification and possible material omissions.
The author believes that as a matter of public policy, lawyers should not be
permitted to perpetrate or assist in a fraud without being held responsible for
their wrongdoing. Interestingly enough, however, at least one court has ex-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. In re Fox River Broadcasting, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 1132, 1136 (1982) (denying Fox River's
application for an FM radio license).
153. Id. at 1136-37 (quoting Leflore Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454, 461 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
154. Id. (quoting Leflore Broadcasting Co. v, FCC, 636 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Lorain
Journal Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
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pressly denied that this is sound public policy. In Schatz v. Rosenberg,'55 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rationalized its rejec-
tion of holding attorneys so accountable by stating:
While we sympathize with plaintiff's position and certainly do not condone
lawyers making misrepresentations, we find that our public policy counsels
against imposing such a duty. Attorney liability to third parties should not
be expanded beyond liability for conflicts of interest. Any other result may
prevent a client from reposing complete trust in his lawyer for fear that he
might reveal a fact which would trigger the lawyer's duty to the third party.
Similarly, if attorneys had a duty to disclose information to third parties,
attorneys would have an incentive not to press clients for information. The
result would not be less securities fraud. Instead, attorneys would more often
be unwitting accomplices to the fraud as a result of being kept in the dark
by their clients or by their own reluctance to obtain information. The better
rule-that attorneys have no duty to "blow the whistle" on their cli-
ents-allows clients to repose complete trust in their damaging or problem-
atic information, and the lawyer will more likely be able to counsel his client
against misconduct. 156
The lawyers in Schatz v. Rosenberg had represented a client who portrayed
himself as financially sound in a written financial statement and update letter.
After the financial statement was submitted but before the update letter was
completed, however, the client's largest business crumbled and the business
filed for bankruptcy. 15 7 The client also filed for personal bankruptcy. 15 8 The
155. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
156. Id. at 493 (citations omitted). The court based its opinion in part on decisions from the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits. In Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989), the Fifth Circuit explained that
[i]t is well understood in the legal community that any significant increase in attor-
ney liability to third parties could have a dramatic effect upon our entire system of
legal ethics. An attorney required by law to disclose "material facts" to third parties
might thus breach his or her duty, required by good ethical standards, to keep attor-
ney-client confidences. Similarly, an attorney required to declare publicly his or her
legal opinion of a client's actions and statements may find it impossible to remain as
loyal to the client as legal edicts properly require.
Id. at 1124.
Similarly, in the accounting context, the Seventh Circuit refused to impose a duty of disclosure
based on public policy reasons in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young:
Such a duty would prevent the client from reposing in the accountant the trust that
is essential to an accurate audit. Firms would withhold documents, allow auditors to
see but not copy, and otherwise emulate the CIA, if they feared that access might
lead to destructive disclosure-for even an honest firm may fear that one of its ac-
countant's many auditors would misunderstand the situation and ring the tocsin need-
lessly, with great loss to the firm.
901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 347 (1990).
For further background on aspects of the decision that offer aid and comfort to the legal profes-
sion, see Milo Geyelin, Lawyers Can't Be Held Liable for Clients' Lies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29,
1991, at BI.
157. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 488.
158. Id.
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lawyers represented both the client and his businesses. The client had person-
ally guaranteed $1.5 million in promissory notes in order to obtain an eighty
percent interest in two other companies.159 The parties who accepted the
promissory notes relied on the financial statement and update letter, which
indicated the client had a personal net worth exceeding $7 million. The prom-
issory notes were never paid, and the injured parties sued the lawyers for, inter
alia, (1) violating section 10(b)(5) of the Securities Act of 1934 and for aiding
and abetting a violation of the securities laws, and (2) knowingly perpetrating
or assisting in common law misrepresentation under Maryland tort law.160
Concerning the securities fraud claims, the court found that a lawyer cannot
be held liable for misrepresentation under section 10(b) of the Securities Act
of 1934 for failing to disclose information about a client to a third party ab-
sent some fiduciary or other confidential relationship with the third party."'
The court distinguished federal securities cases that have held attorneys liable
under section 10(b) for failing to disclose misrepresentations made by clients
to third parties." It agreed with other cases that held lawyers had no duty of
disclosure absent some fiduciary relationship with the third party.? 3 Indeed,
the court quoted one ruling that "[n]either lawyers nor accountants are re-
quired to tattle on their clients in the absence of some duty to disclose. To the
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 492.
162. The Schatz court distinguished two cases where attorneys had issued "a reckless and mis-
leading bond opinion letter," in that the only charge against the lawyers here was that they
"failed to tattle on their client for misrepresenting his personal financial condition." Id. at 491.
The distinguished cases were T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Authority, 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984), and Cronin v.
Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authority, 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980). Schatz, 943
F.2d at 491. The Schatz court also distinguished cases where attorneys were found liable when
they made affirmative misrepresentations, such as drafting false prospectuses or other securities
documents. Id. at 491-92 (distinguishing Renovitch v. Stewardship Concepts, Inc., 654 F. Supp.
353, 359 (N.D. III. 1987); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Lit., 593 F. Supp. 612, 617-18 (D.
Minn. 1984); and Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 266-67 (D. Or. 1972)).
163. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 491 (citing Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1048 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that outside of a fiduciary duty to a third-party investor, attorneys had no duty to
disclose financial information about the client to the investor); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858
F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that underwriter's counsel owed bondholders no duty to dis-
close inaccuracies in an offering statement for the bonds, although counsel had a duty of due
diligence to investigate the representations in the statement and although counsel permitted its
name to appear on the cover of the offering statement), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Fryar
v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d
775, 780 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding bond counsel was not liable to the bond purchaser for a
false opinion letter based on a purportedly false assumption); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that, because neither section 10(b) nor
Rule lOb-5 imposes a duty to disclose, any duty must arise from a fiduciary relationship outside
the securities laws); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585 (D. Haw. 1985) (finding that lawyer owed
no duty to investors buying from organization because the organization, and not the investors, was
the client); Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, 589 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that counsel to
partnership owed no duty of disclosure to limited partners)).
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contrary, attorneys have privileges not to disclose. ' 164 The court held that, un-
less there is a relationship of trust and confidence between a lawyer and a
third party, the federal securities laws do not impose upon a lawyer a duty to
disclose information to a third party.1" Additionally, as the lawyers owed no
duty to disclose the existence of the misrepresentations, the court found that
the lawyers could not be held liable as aiders and abettors for failing to dis-
close this information.166
Concerning the common law claims asserted against the lawyers, the Schatz
court found that under Maryland law a lawyer owes a duty only to his clients
or third-party beneficiaries of the attorney-client relationship.16 No duty arose
in this case where the injured party was neither a client nor a third-party
beneficiary. The court also found that an ethical duty of disclosure did not
create a corresponding legal duty under the federal securities laws.166
The Schatz court concluded that the attorneys were not to be held liable for
their client's lies. The court considered only the legal issues in a lawyer's
knowing incorporation of a client's misrepresentation. Almost apologetically,
the court stated that "we do not sit as an ethics or other attorney disciplinary
committee, but as a civil court with a duty to interpret the securities laws, and
the solution to these legal issues cannot be found in the securities laws."169
In the context of representing applicants before the Federal Communica-
tions Commission for new television and broadcast stations, there is generally
no "third party." In this regard, the Schatz case, and others like it, contem-
plated the presence or absence of the attorney's fiduciary relationship to third
parties. Attorneys appearing in ex parte proceedings before the FCC are not
concerned with the rights of third parties-they are seeking an exclusive gov-
ernment grant of a valuable permit or license. They owe a duty of candor to
the tribunal as well as a duty of loyalty to the client. These duties may conflict
at times, but the attorney must resolve that conflict. In the context of ex parte
proceedings before an administrative agency, the attorney should resolve that
conflict in favor of full disclosure to the agency. Attorneys must also be pre-
pared to withdraw from representation in appropriate cases.
Will unscrupulous clients take advantage of a rule making the attorney per-
sonally responsible for the content of applications for new radio and television
broadcast licenses? A cynical observer may determine that if clients under-
stand that attorneys may personally serve as potential "whipping boys" for
sins of the unprincipled broadcast station applicant, this may perversely in-
crease fraud or misstatements in applications or other papers filed with the
164. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 491 (citing Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d
490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986)).
165. Id. at 492.
166. Id. at 495-98.
167. Id. at 492 (citing Flaherly v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618 (Md. 1985)).
168. Id. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' refusals to
use ethical codes to define standards of civil liability for lawyers.
169. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 498.
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administrative agency. Increased deception would indeed be a counterproduc-
tive and sorrowful result of a rule imposing increased liability on attorneys.
This author hopes and believes, however, that the existence of the enhanced
rule itself will not increase the tendency for clients to lie to or hide information
from their attorneys. The enhanced rule does not relieve applicants for broad-
cast licenses from the consequences of their own misstatements; the clients
remain ultimately responsible for the truth of statements made in the
application.
CONCLUSION
In the abstract, it is easy to recommend a higher standard of care for attor-
neys who prepare applications for new radio or television broadcast stations. It
is easy to discount the costs and inconvenience involved in verification of state-
ments made to the attorney. Attorneys, after all, should not be required to
cross-examine their clients on every fact. In the context of obtaining a new
broadcast station application, however, the client may have a financial motive
to provide false or incomplete information to the attorney. The client may feel
that "what my attorney doesn't know won't hurt me." From the attorney's
subconscious point of view, it also may be easier to believe the client once the
retainer has been paid. In cases where the attorney is working for a flat-rate
fee, rather than at an hourly rate, there may also be no incentive to expend
extra time and energy to investigate the client's representations.
It is the licensee who is ultimately responsible for identifying and serving
the needs and interests of the broadcast audience. 170 It is also the applicant for
the broadcast license who is ultimately responsible for the truth of statements
made in the application. Yet, if an attorney who assists in the application
knows or has reason to know that the application for a new broadcast station
contains a false statement of fact or omits a material fact, the attorney also
should be personally accountable for the contents of that application. This is
especially true for situations implicating a calculated recklessness toward
learning the truth, as illustrated in the immigration attorney decisions and in
discussions of the duty of candor before the Patent and Trademark. Office.
Attorneys who know of other attorneys who take part in unethical conduct are
under an ethical duty themselves to report that attorney to the proper
authorities.171
Imposing potential personal liability upon attorneys who prepare these ap-
plications will provide a greater incentive for the attorney to verify any suspi-
cious facts. The possibility of personal liability also may provide some leverage
against recalcitrant clients who may try to hide material information from the
attorney who prepares the application. The importance of the public interest in
170. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3003 (1990) (quoting FCC MINORITY
OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MINORITY OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING 1 (1978)).
171. See, e.g., In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (suspending attorney for failure to
report another attorney's conversion of client funds).
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the airwaves, when viewed against exclusive government grants to individuals,
also supports the need for attorneys to exercise only the highest ethical stan-
dards in preparing applications for new radio and television broadcast stations.

